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O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    dentifying the status of individuals involved in hostilities has been one of 
the greatest challenges presented to States by modern armed conflict. And 
yet, correctly determining individual status in the wartime detention context 
is imperative because this determination establishes which laws and at-
tendant responsibilities regulate the detaining power, and which protections 
apply for both the detaining power and the detainee. The law of armed con-
flict provides much more detail and clarity for combatants detained as pris-
oners of war in international armed conflict (IAC) than for non-state fighters 
detained in non-international armed conflict (NIAC). However, the vast ma-
jority of conflicts over the past several decades have been NIACs and gaps 
in the law remain. 
States engaged in hostilities have a clear interest in keeping enemy fight-
ers removed from the conflict for as long as hostilities endure. But modern 
detention operations have generated complex legal, financial, and political 
challenges for the detaining authority that incentivize detaining as few indi-
viduals and for as short a time as possible. Detainee review processes (DRPs) 
offer States a method for determining whom they may and, for operational 
purposes, whom they must detain. Although States may be hesitant to initiate 
review processes that might be interpreted as legitimizing a non-State en-
emy’s fighting force or rewarding individuals for their unlawful participation 
in hostilities or failure to distinguish themselves, States benefit from deter-
mining the status of detainees in NIACs to ensure that the right people are 
being held for the right amount of time and under the right conditions. DRPs 
help to prevent mistaken and unnecessarily prolonged detention, saving the 
detaining power financial, personnel, and infrastructure resources, and 
avoiding some of the difficulties associated with detaining the wrong people 
or detaining more people than required.   
DRPs also provide obvious benefits to the detainee. Knowing that there 
will be an opportunity to be heard and that there will be some form of legal 
or administrative process can give detainees a sense of fairness, justice, and 
hope. In the United States’ experience, DRPs have led to the transfer or 
release of the vast majority of detainees in U.S. custody. And regular process 
for detainees can contribute to order and stability within the detention facil-
ity. At the same time, DRPs may provide the detaining power with an addi-
tional opportunity for intelligence collection. By establishing a process for 
reviewing the detainee’s status and threat, which will often include hearing 
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from the detainee, the State may as a byproduct discover information that 
could be useful intelligence in its war effort. DRPs also provide the State 
with greater support and legitimacy, particularly with allies and partners in 
the conflict. 
Yet, while the need for review of detainees has never been more imper-
ative, the law of armed conflict is almost completely silent on the subject of 
detainee review procedures. In addition, although there has been a tremen-
dous amount of scholarly attention to contemporary detention issues over 
the past fifteen years, including the unique challenges posed by detention in 
the context of NIACs,1 there has been relatively little specific focus on de-
tainee review processes.2 Accordingly, the object of this article is to identify 
an appropriate legal framework for detainee review, examine U.S. state prac-
tice in the area, and provide practical guidelines for developing and imple-
menting detainee review processes. 
 
II. KEY TERMS AND U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
Before turning to the proposed guidelines, it is necessary to define key terms 
and to recognize the role U.S. policy and practice have played in the devel-
opment of these concepts.  
 
A. Key Terms 
 
“Non-international armed conflict” applies to any situation where a non-
State armed group is engaged in the hostilities, the intensity of the violence 
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving 
Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 Yale Journal of International Law 369 (2008); 
Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 Texas In-
ternational Law Journal 1 (2011); Adam R. Pearlman, Meaningful Review and Process Due: How 
Guantanamo Detention is Changing the Battlefield, 6 Harvard National Security Journal 255 
(2015). 
2. Of note, Andrea Harrison, Deputy Legal Adviser for the International Committee 
of the Red Cross Regional Delegation to the United States and Canada, recently published 
an excellent article examining the United States’ periodic review board process. See Andrea 
Harrison, Periodic Review Boards for Law of War Detention in Guantanamo: What’s Next?, 24 ILSA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 541 (2018). 
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is protracted, and the parties are sufficiently organized.3 As used in this arti-
cle, there are no temporal or geographical limitations on such a conflict. 
“Detainee” applies to individuals held in preventive and non-punitive 
detention by the opposing party to the conflict under the law of armed con-
flict. “Detention” should be given this same meaning: the holding of enemy 
fighters during armed conflict in a preventive, non-punitive condition in ac-
cordance with the law of armed conflict.  
“Review process” includes operational and procedural efforts by a party 
to an armed conflict to determine whether an individual is legally detainable 
(the “status review”) and whether that detained individual must continue to 
be held in detention because of the threat he or she poses to the detaining 
country (the “threat review”). 
The term “initial review” or “status review” will be controversial for 
many readers. Status categories do not exist in NIAC, so determining status 
may seem unnecessary. Yet, the principle of distinction applies in NIAC and 
separates fighters from civilians for targeting purposes. Some States simply 
apply IAC law by analogy to situations like detention in NIACs.4 As a prac-
tical matter, responsible parties to a conflict seek to capture and detain only 
enemy fighters, rather than civilians. The purpose of a “status review” is to 
determine whether a captured individual is a civilian or a fighter. The United 
States, as well as Israel,5 has characterized these fighters as unlawful combat-
ants or unprivileged belligerents.6 
The terms “subsequent review” and “threat review” may also provoke 
controversy. The purpose of subsequent review is to determine whether a 
detainee who is initially found to be detainable represents an enduring threat 
                                                                                                                      
3. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). 
4. HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? (Marco Sassòli, Antoine Bouvier & Anne Quin-
tin eds., 3d. ed. 2011), https://casebook.icrc.org/law/non-international-armed-conflict#_ 
ftn_vii_001 
Other authors and States consider that fighters may be attacked in non-international armed conflicts 
like combatants may be attacked in international armed conflicts, i.e. at any time until they surrender 
or are otherwise hors de combat. Some of those who promote this analogy also consider that captured 
fighters may be detained, like prisoners of war in international armed conflicts, without any individual 
judicial determination until the end of the conflict. 
5. See Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762–2002, § 2 (2002) (Isr.). 
6. See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2310.01E, DoD Detainee Program 
(2014), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/231001e. 
pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive 2310.01E]. Originally, the U.S. Government designated 
these fighters as simply “enemy combatants.” 
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such that continued detention is necessary. A number of factors may be as-
sessed here, including whether the person has disavowed or severed ties with 
the non-State armed group, declared his or her intent to live peacefully, 
demonstrated a plan for his or her post-detention life, introduced family or 
community members willing to vouch for him or her, or demonstrated that 
the receiving country is capable of ensuring his or her peacefulness. Of 
course, subsequent reviews may also reassess the initial determination of sta-
tus if new information becomes available or for any other relevant reason. 
 
B. U.S. Policy and Practice 
 
This article is focused on the United States’ policy and practice in developing 
detainee review processes. At least in the modern era, the United States has 
the most extensive experience in detaining unprivileged belligerents and de-
veloping processes to review them. Following 9/11, the United States has 
detained well over 100,000 individuals in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guan-
tanamo Bay (GTMO). Many of these detainees have been part of one or 
more of the United States’ detainee review processes. No other State comes 
close in terms of scope and depth of practice in this area. 
The author served as the principal drafter of the U.S. government poli-
cies that created and institutionalized its current detainee review processes 
and worked first-hand on their implementation and operation. Because of 
these policies, the United States adopted important doctrinal starting points, 
including the inherent legality of detaining the enemy in NIAC, the preven-
tive and non-punitive nature of detention, and the supremacy of the law of 
armed conflict in governing detention during armed conflict. Key aspects of 
these issues are discussed below. 
 
III. LAW APPLICABLE TO DETAINEE REVIEW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS 
 
The primary body of law that governs detention during armed conflict is the 
law of armed conflict.7 Detention during armed conflict is preventive and 
                                                                                                                      
7. But see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8) (noting that the International Court of Justice concluded that 
even if the law governing armed conflict served as lex specialis, “the protection of the Inter-
national Covenant of [sic] Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except 
by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated 
from in a time of national emergency.”). 
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non-punitive and the purpose of holding a fighter or civilian directly partic-
ipating in hostilities is simply to remove the individual from the battlefield 
so that they cannot contribute to the war effort of the enemy force. Although 
deprivation of liberty may be unpleasant and difficult, detention of enemy 
fighters is lawful and should be humane. It is generally accepted that within 
international law—where consent is nearly always required to bind States—
what is not prohibited is permitted.8 And detention in NIAC is not only not 
prohibited, it is clearly presumed in Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and in the 1977 Additional Protocol (AP II) to the Conven-
tions.9 Notably, a resolution adopted by State Parties at the last International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Quadrennial Review Conference af-
firmed that “deprivation of liberty is an ordinary and expected occurrence in 
armed conflict, and that under international humanitarian law (IHL) States 
have, in all forms of armed conflict . . . the power to detain . . . .”10 
The law of armed conflict was principally designed to address IACs, 
where individuals are comparatively easy to identify. Within IACs, combat-
ants are members of State armed forces and the volunteer corps or militias 
that support them, and civilians are everyone else.11 When combatants or 
                                                                                                                      
8. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 44–45 (Sept. 7). 
9. See, e.g., Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(1), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (providing that “Persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities, including . . . those placed . . . [in] detention . . . shall 
in all circumstances be treated humanely . . . .”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts art. 5(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that “persons deprived 
of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or de-
tained” be subject to certain protections, and that “[t]hose who are responsible for the in-
ternment or detention of the persons” follow certain responsibilities for the protection of 
those detained). 
10. 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Strengthening 
International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty ¶ 2 (Dec. 8–
10, 2015), https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/32nd-international-conference-red-cross-
and-red-crescent-strengthening-international. But see Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence 
[2017] UKSC 2, [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that the UK 
Supreme Court determined that detention in NIAC is not implicitly authorized). 
11. The traditional understanding of status under the law of armed conflict is that indi-
viduals who belong to the groups described in Article 4(a)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of GC III are 
combatants, and all others are civilians. Jean Pictet notes in his authoritative Commentary on 
the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a 
prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the 
Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who 
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civilians are captured in an IAC, they are subject to the conditions and pro-
cesses set forth in Geneva Convention III (GC III) and Geneva Convention 
IV (GC IV), respectively. Although there is typically less need to assess the 
status of individuals in IACs, those Conventions provide reviews for bellig-
erents detained during an IAC where there is doubt as to whether they are 
entitled to prisoner of war status,12 and civilians held in internment for an 
extended period during an IAC or an occupation.13 
But most armed conflicts are now NIACs, where a far less-developed 
body of law governs and temporal markers and the status of parties and in-
dividual fighters are all less clear. And in a NIAC, it is not only more difficult 
to determine if individuals are members of the enemy force, but also whether 
these individuals will continue to fight if released from detention.14 Yet de-
spite this significant lack of clarity regarding individual and group status,15 
                                                                                                                      
is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands 
can be outside the law. 
OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51, ¶4 (1958). 
12. GC III, supra note 9, art. 5. Whether the United States should have conducted “Ar-
ticle 5 Tribunals” to determine the status of individuals captured at the outset of the war 
against al-Qaida and the Taliban is debatable. However, while some initial review probably 
would have assisted in better determining the identity of the detainees, an Article 5 review 
is meant only to determine whether the individual is due prisoner of war protections and 
not to assess whether they are detainable. In a NIAC, where prisoner of war status does not 
apply, this assessment would be inappropriate and unnecessary. See Geoffrey Corn, Eric 
Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, Understanding the Distinct Function of the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals: A Response to Blocher, 116 YALE LAW JOURNAL POCKET PART 327, 327 (2007). 
13. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 
43, 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
14. It is harder to determine if fighters are members of a non-state armed group because 
they do not usually wear uniforms, have insignia, or belong to a state. It is harder to deter-
mine if they will continue to fight because the end of hostilities is generally more amorphous, 
fighters often do not have to comply with a specific state decision, and fighters do not 
always follow an identified leader. 
15. In NIACs, many argue that status categories do not exist as a technical matter. For 
example, Marco Sassoli explains, “Prisoner of war or civilian protected status under the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, respectively, do not apply [in NIAC]. Members of 
organized armed groups are entitled to no special status under the laws of non-international 
armed conflict.” Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the “War on Terrorism,” 22 
LAW AND INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 195, 208–09 (2004). This 
fact may be the result of States trying to discourage non-State actors from engaging in armed 
conflict by refusing to recognize their combatant equality. It may also be due to an assump-
tion, particularly in the aftermath of the two World Wars, that NIACs would be fought 
internally, for example, civil wars and wars of liberation, and would therefore be governed 
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the law governing NIAC provides very little guidance for detainee operations 
generally,16 and no guidance for review processes specifically. In fact, neither 
Common Article 3 nor APII requires parties to a NIAC to conduct reviews 
for detainees to determine their status or to assess the continued necessity 
of their detention. 
For this reason, many legal experts and practitioners have looked to the 
law governing IAC for appropriate and useful analogies.17 However, in this 
context there is an ongoing debate over whether members of non-state 
armed groups should be considered belligerent civilians under a GC IV an-
alogue or unprivileged combatants under a GC III analogue.18 Non-State 
armed groups, even if constituted and equipped like a regular State armed 
force, are not “privileged” to engage in hostilities. Therefore, such unprivi-
leged fighters participate in hostilities with the key liabilities of combatant 
status, such as becoming the lawful object of attack, without the correspond-
ing protections, such as immunity for their lawful belligerent acts.19 
Although this area of the law is still unsettled,20 because non-state armed 
groups behave more like regular State armed forces that are continuously 
                                                                                                                      
primarily by domestic law. Either way, many experts and practitioners often look to the IAC 
status categories to draw appropriate analogies for individual status in NIAC. See infra note 
17. 
16. See BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND DENIAL: THE CASE FOR CANDOR AFTER 
GUANTÁNAMO 131 (2011) 
Both U.S. and international laws governing such detentions are woefully underdeveloped. 
The Geneva Conventions require only that the detaining party convene a “competent tri-
bunal” if there is doubt about a captive’s entitlement to treatment as a prisoner of war—or, 
presumably, about his identification as a combatant. The scope of the government’s deten-
tion authority and the contours of the review mechanisms remain, years into the conflict, 
utterly undefined—or, rather, defined only in administrative procedures and regulations. 
17. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 17.2.2.3 (rev. ed. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] 
If an action is not prohibited by the law of war applicable to international armed conflict, it 
generally would not be prohibited by the law of war applicable to non-international armed 
conflict. For example, analogous provisions of the GPW and GC may be helpful for un-
derstanding the baseline standards in international law for detention. 
See also id. § 17.17.1.1. 
18. See, e.g., Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Indefinite Detention under the Laws of War, 
22 STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 41, 112–13 (2011). 
19. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL supra note 17, § 4.3; see also DoD Directive 2310.01E, 
supra note 6. 
20. Many commentators approach the status of non-State fighters in NIACs from a 
GC IV perspective, analogizing them to civilians “directly participating in hostilities.” See, 
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engaged in hostilities and less like civilians who are temporarily engaged in 
hostilities, it makes more sense to treat members of such groups as combat-
ants under a GC III analogue. Treating members of organized non-State 
armed groups as combatants helps meet the primary purpose of detention 
during NIAC: removing fighters from the battlefield for the duration of hos-
tilities. But other than Article 5, which requires minimal process in cases 
where detained individuals might be entitled to prisoner of war protections, 
GC III is silent on detainee review. Indeed, the presumption in an IAC with 
regard to combatants is that if they are part of the enemy force they are 
detainable without any kind of process for the duration of hostilities. 
As noted above, even if we look to IAC law related to civilian internment 
for analogies to guide NIAC DRPs, there is little guidance available. The 
brief references to “civilian security reviews” in GC IV do not prescribe 
much process or procedure for conducting these reviews.21 Article 43 re-
quires only that a person interned or placed in assigned residence be entitled 
to have the decision reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court 
or administrative board and periodically reviewed twice a year thereafter.22 
Similarly, Article 78 only provides that decisions regarding assigned resi-
dence or internment during situations of occupation be made according to a 
regular procedure to be prescribed by the occupying power.23 Such decisions 
must be subject to periodic review every six months by a competent body 
established by the occupying power.24 Even Article 75(3) of Additional Pro-
tocol I (AP I) only requires prompt notification in a language the detainee 
understands of the reasons for his or her detention.25  
Customary international law does not provide much more in terms of 
procedural requirements or guidance. In the ICRC’s Customary International 
Humanitarian Law study, Rule 99 prohibits “arbitrary deprivation of liberty” 
                                                                                                                      
e.g., Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”, 85 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 45, 73 (2003) (“[I]t can hardly be maintained that un-
lawful combatants are not entitled to any protection whatsoever under international human-
itarian law. If they fulfil the nationality criteria of GC IV’s Article 4, they are clearly protected 
by that convention.”). 
21. GC IV, supra note 13, arts. 43, 78. 
22. Id. art. 43. 
23. Id. art. 78. 
24. Id. 
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
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as a customary norm.26 However, other than the brief references from Arti-
cles 43 and 78 of GC IV, and Article 75 of AP I, the study is unable to 
identify procedural requirements for IAC detainee review.27 
Thus, while the law of armed conflict is the lex specialis in times of armed 
conflict and may be best suited to govern general detention operations in 
NIACs, the dearth of procedural provisions related to DRPs within the law 
of armed conflict has led some practitioners to look to human rights law for 
guidance. For example, in its Customary International Humanitarian Law study, 
the ICRC points to human rights law as a source of additional legal require-
ments for NIACs, but even then only identifies as customary the require-
ments to “inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest,” to 
“bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a judge,” and 
to “provide a person deprived of liberty with an opportunity to challenge the 
lawfulness of detention.”28  
The key human rights law instrument that might be relevant, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), provides some di-
rection for detainee review, but importantly, is intended for situations of 
municipal punitive or pretrial detention and not preventive detention during 
armed conflict.29 Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits “arbitrary detention” and 
requires that persons arrested or subject to detention be promptly informed 
of the reasons for the arrest and made aware of any charges against them.30 
                                                                                                                      
26. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 344–52 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). Notably, the U.S. government formally 
responded to the ICRC’s study, criticizing the methodology by which rules were formed. It 
did not single out Rule 99 as being specifically ill-supported as it had done with a number 
of other rules, but some of the overall concerns related to the study’s characterization of 
State practice and opinion juris may apply to this rule as well. 
27. Id. at 344–46. 
28. Id. at 349–50. See also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Ad-
ministrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375, 375–91 (2005). 
29. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 1.6.3, addresses this issue. Further, 
the Manual adds in section 1.6.3.1: 
For example, the right to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest before a court provided in 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) would appear 
to conflict with the authority under the law of war to detain certain persons without judicial 
process or criminal charge. However, the United States has understood Article 9 of the 
ICCPR not to affect a State’s authorities under the law of war, including a State’s authority 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts to detain enemy combatants 
until the end of hostilities. 
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). 
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It also requires that persons deprived of their liberty be “entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is 
not lawful.”31 Article 14 then prescribes some fundamental process and pro-
cedural guarantees.32 
Again, these guarantees from the ICCPR were not created to apply to 
detention during armed conflict, as indicated by the fact that States negoti-
ating the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions had access to the 
ICCPR but chose not to include its more specific and, in some cases, more 
demanding provisions. Therefore, the ICCPR may supply certain reasonable 
and legitimate procedures that might make sense to import to NIAC de-
tainee review, but States must be careful not to adopt wholesale standards 
that make sense in a criminal law enforcement context but are impracticable 
in many situations of armed conflict. The result of such hybridization of the 
law of armed conflict and the law of peace could lead to undermining the 
purpose and function of each body of law by lowering the relevant standards 
to the least common denominator. 
Because NIAC law does not require or provide procedures for detainee 
review, States have looked for relevant analogues in IAC and customary in-
ternational law. But the law governing IAC is mostly silent on detainee re-
view and neither IAC nor customary international law provides any specific 
procedures. Human rights law, too, has offered States additional elements 
for detainee review procedures, but its focus on fundamental procedural 
guarantees for the punitive and pre-trial detention context provides an im-
perfect analogy for detainee review during armed conflict. Thus, a gap exists 
in both the lex specialis and lex generalis governing detainee review procedures. 
 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE NEED FOR DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESSES 
 
Although the law may not require States to conduct review processes in NI-
ACs, States and legal experts have begun to see utility in filling this gap in 
                                                                                                                      
31. Id. art. 9(4). 
32. Id. art. 14. These guarantees include the right to a fair and public hearing by a com-
petent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law; prompt and detailed notifi-
cation of the charges in a language the detainee understands; adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of the detainee’s defense and to communicate with counsel of his or her 
own choosing; trial without undue delay; attendance and the ability to defend oneself at his 
or her own proceedings; legal assistance; examination of witnesses; free assistance of an 
interpreter if necessary; and the right to appeal a conviction or sentence to a higher tribunal. 
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the law with the development and implementation of DRPs. In an influential 
2005 article, ICRC Senior Legal Adviser Jelena Pejic outlined detailed and 
instructive guidelines for situations of internment and administrative deten-
tion,33 which she defined as “the deprivation of liberty of a person that has 
been initiated/ordered by the executive branch—not the judiciary—without 
criminal charges being brought against the internee/administrative de-
tainee.”34 She also acknowledged that the principles identified apply “as a 
matter both of law and of policy,” noting the ongoing controversy with some 
of them, including legal assistance.35 Pejic’s list parallels some of the more 
prominent features of contemporary State policy and practice, especially that 
of the United States. For example, she identifies prompt notification, the 
right to challenge the grounds of detention, independence and impartiality 
of the review board, legal assistance, periodic review, and detainee participa-
tion as essential procedural safeguards.36 All of these safeguards have been 
part of U.S. detainee review processes. 
While many States have agreed that conducting DRPs in NIACs consti-
tute a “best practice” and have supported their development in international 
initiatives,37 few States have actually conducted them, and none on the scale 
or scope of the United States. In a 2009 speech, President Barack Obama 
stated that the United States “must have a thorough process of periodic re-
view, so that any prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified.”38 
The former U.S. official responsible for overseeing detainee policy, William 
K. Lietzau, elaborated on this theme in a 2012 article, arguing that “[t]wenty-
first-century sensibilities will not stomach indefinite detention without pro-
cess,”39 and that because the conflict with al-Qaida “suffers from lack of 
clarity regarding both the ‘who’ and ‘when’ for long-term detention … [t]hat 
                                                                                                                      
33. Pejic, supra note 28, at 375–76. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 376. 
36. Id. at 384–91. 
37. See, e.g., The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Oper-
ations: Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
1368 (2012) [hereinafter The Copenhagen Process]; see also International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Strengthening International Humanitarian Law – Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, 
ICRC (April 27, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/strengthening-international-
humanitarian-law-protecting-persons-deprived-their-liberty. 
38. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the 
National Archives (May 21, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09. 
39. William K. Lietzau, Detention of Terrorists in the Twenty-First Century, 88 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 323, 338 (2012). 
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weakness … is best rectified by the establishment of a clear process from 
which both the government and the detainee can benefit.”40 
To that end, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) included in its 2014 
reissuance of DoD Directive 2310.01E—the governing document for all 
DoD detainee operations—a requirement to “review periodically the deten-
tion of all individuals in DoD custody or control who do not receive the 
protections afforded POWs.”41 According to the Directive, such reviews 
may include: “(1) Preliminary assessments of the detainee’s status and threat, 
(2) Formal determinations of the lawfulness and continued necessity of de-
tention, [and] (3) Determination of the status of unprivileged belligerents 
held in long-term detention, presided over by a military judge.”42  
This policy requirement, though general in nature, reflects a strong com-
mitment to detainee review during armed conflict, including subsequent pe-
riodic review and judicial review for long-term detention. Further, it under-
scores seventeen years of U.S. practice in developing and conducting DRPs. 
Although very few States have conducted reviews of detainees in NIACs, 
many States have agreed that the policy and practice of reviewing a detainee’s 
status and threat to eliminate unnecessary detentions is a positive direction 
for law and policy to take. Here, the most notable example is the Copenha-
gen Process, a state-led initiative hosted by the Danish Government, which 
identified DRPs as a best practice in NIAC. In 2007, the project commenced 
what would become a five-year process to identify principles and guidelines 
for detention during international military operations in NIACs. Having wit-
nessed coalition forces encounter persistent difficulties with detention in-
teroperability in Afghanistan and Iraq, participating governments sought to 
“reach consensus among States and relevant international organizations on 
the international legal regimes applicable to taking and handling detainees in 
military operations; and to agree upon generally acceptable principles, rules, 
and standards for the treatment of detainees.”43 
Over the course of the five-year project, the scope and direction of the 
                                                                                                                      
40. Id. at 336. 
41. DoD Directive 2310.01E, supra note 6, § 3(i). 
42. Id. 
43. Bruce Oswald & Thomas Winkler, Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines on the 
Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, 16 ASIL INSIGHTS (Dec. 26, 2012), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/39/copenhagen-process-principles-and-
guidelines-handling-detainees (citing Thomas Winkler, The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A 
Necessity, 78 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (2009)). 
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project varied, from taking on the intersection of detainee standards in hu-
man rights law and international humanitarian law, to attempting to fashion 
rules that could apply in law enforcement situations. Ultimately, participating 
States narrowed the scope of application to international military operations 
in the context of non-international armed conflict and peace operations.44  
While the Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines (CPPG) re-
state some legal requirements, they are not intended to apply to IACs.45 Nor 
does the CPPG “create new legal obligations or authorizations under inter-
national law,”46 or “affect the applicability of international law to military 
operations conducted by States or international organizations, the obliga-
tions of their personnel to respect such law, or the applicability of interna-
tional and national law to non-State actors.”47 Yet, this narrowed focus 
masks Copenhagen’s progressive achievement, namely, applying as “best 
practices” key legal norms from IAC detention operations to NIAC deten-
tion operations. As former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser John 
Bellinger notes, it is also “valuable to have the principles collected in a single 
place and endorsed by a sizeable and diverse group of countries and interna-
tional organizations.”48 
U.S. practice and policy heavily influenced the CPPG.49 The United 
States was engaged throughout the Copenhagen Process, participating in all 
of the meetings and frequently meeting with representatives of the Danish 
                                                                                                                      
44. The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37. The Chairman’s commentary further clarifies 
the scope of the document: 
For example, several States may be assisting a host State against non-State armed groups. 
In some cases, these operations may have the character of “armed conflict.” In peace op-
erations, military operations may be conducted to restore or maintain order pursuant to a 
mandate by the UN Security Council (UNSC) or on the basis of international law by other 
competent international organisations. 
Id. cmt. 1.2. 
45. Id. princ. 9. 
46. Id. princ. 2. 
47. Id. princ. 11. 
48. John Bellinger, Completion of Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines on Detainees in 
International Military Operations, LAWFARE (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
completion-copenhagen-process-principles-and-guidelines-detainees-international-mili-
tary-operations. 
49. In a strange diplomatic moment near the end of the conference, and before States 
“welcomed” the CPPG, a member of the Russian delegation pointedly asked the other del-
egates why they would highlight positive State practice in the preamble when all the dele-
gates knew that the reference was to U.S. practice, including that practice at Guantanamo. 
Not only did the Russian intervention receive no support from the delegates at the confer-
ence, the reference to State practice was moved to a more prominent place in the document. 
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Government and other foreign partners over the course of the project to 
provide ideas and examples of practices and lessons learned from its ongoing 
detention operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantanamo Bay. The 
United States insisted early and often that the outcome document reflect 
genuine State practice and serve as a model that States could employ.  
The CPPG has two principles primarily related to DRPs. First, Principle 
7 recognizes the desirability that “[p]ersons detained . . . be promptly in-
formed of the reasons for their detention in a language that they under-
stand.”50 Although the law does not require such notification, prompt noti-
fications became standard practice for all persons detained by the United 
States in Afghanistan.51 The Chairman’s Commentary to the CPPG adds im-
portant elements to this principle of prompt notification, such as the de-
tainee being allowed to “participat[e] in subsequent review procedures from 
an informed position,” providing the detainee with “information regarding 
the circumstances that form the basis for detention,” and offering interpret-
ers to aid the detainee in communicating with the review body.52 
Second, Principle 12 recognizes the importance of subsequent periodic 
review. In cases of security detention, the CPPG finds that after an initial 
review, an “impartial and objective authority that is authorised to determine 
the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention” should periodi-
cally reconsider the decision to detain.53 The commentary clarifies that the 
“impartial and objective authority” may be a military review body.54 In addi-
tion, although the authority does not need to be a judge or a lawyer, the 
authority should be supported by a legal adviser and have “sufficient infor-
mation available to make an assessment of the legality and propriety of con-
tinued detention.”55 The commentary also recommends whenever feasible a 
personal representative be assigned to assist the detainee in the review pro-
cess, an interpreter be provided where necessary, full detainee participation 
in the review hearing when practically possible, and prompt notification of 
the outcome of the process.56 
                                                                                                                      
50. The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, princ. 7. 
51. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. § 13,567 (2011); see also Jeff Bovarnick, Detainee 
Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, ARMY LAWYER, June 2010, at 
9, 22, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Bovarnick-Detainee.pdf. 
52. The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, princ. 7, cmt. 7.1. 
53. Id. princ. 12. 
54. Id. princ. 12, cmt. 12.2. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. cmt. 12.4. 
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In terms of periodicity, the commentary suggests that reviews occur as 
often as necessary—generally every six months—but that “the length of time 
between reviews may also depend on the thoroughness of the review process 
and on whether there is a true prospect that the legal or factual predicates 
justifying detention have changed.”57 It adds that “more thorough reviews 
may require more resources and take place over longer intervals.”58 
Following the conclusion of the Copenhagen Process, the Danish Gov-
ernment signaled its intent to attach the CPPG to future authorizations for 
multinational military operations in NIACs. Bruce Oswald, an external con-
sultant for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Copenhagen Pro-
cess, anticipated that the outcome might “influence the ICRC discussions 
and any other discussions or developments concerning detention that might 
arise in the future.”59 While some human rights organizations have criticized 
the CPPG because of the lack of civil society participation and alleged low-
ering of standards to the “lowest common denominator,”60 the State-led na-
ture of the process and its focus on State practice may make the CPPG an 
important first step toward wider adoption of DRP standards. 
 
V. THE EVOLUTION AND MAJOR FEATURES OF THE UNITED STATES’   
DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESSES 
 
No State in the modern era has devoted more attention in doctrine or prac-
tice to its detainee operations than the United States. Over the course of the 
post-9/11 armed conflicts, the United States has continually developed and 
modified its detainee review processes. At GTMO, under the Bush Admin-
istration the United States used Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs)61 to determine a detainee’s status and Administrative Review 
                                                                                                                      
57. Id. cmt. 12.3. 
58. Id. 
59. Oswald & Winkler, supra note 43. 
60. See, e.g., Copenhagen “Principles” on Military Detainees Undermine Human Rights, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 22, 2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/10/co-
penhagen-principles-military-detainees-undermine-human-rights/. 
61. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Implementation of Combat-
ant Status Review Tribunal Procedures of Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (July 14, 2006) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter CSRT Procedures]. 
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Boards (ARBs)62 to determine a detainee’s threat level. Similarly, in Afghan-
istan, the administration used Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards 
(UECRBs)63 to review status and threat, as well as a variety of review pro-
cesses in Iraq, including the Multinational Force Review Committee Boards 
(MNFRCs)64 to review continued threat and potential for release. 
The Obama Administration suspended CSRTs and ARBs in its first year 
and created the Guantanamo Review Task Force to review the status of all 
detainees at Guantanamo. Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) were then created 
after conclusion of the Task Force review to assess the continuing threat of 
certain detainees.65 Similarly, in Afghanistan, the administration suspended 
the UECRBs and replaced them with Detainee Review Boards (DRBs).66 
The Trump Administration has continued the PRB process of reviewing the 
threat level of certain Guantanamo detainees on a regular basis.67 
The United States has consistently reformed its DRPs over the course 
of almost two decades, seeking to improve these processes with input from 
civil society, partners and allies, and international organizations. What began 
as rudimentary and informal activities has developed into robust formal pro-
cesses. Some common practices and principles emerge when assessing the 
most recent versions of U.S. DRPs. Although slightly different in purpose 
and scope, both review regimes provide that: 
 
                                                                                                                      
62. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Revised Implementation of 
Administrative Review Procedures for Detained Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (July 14, 2006) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter ARB Procedures]. 
63. Annex E: Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB), to the CJTF-101 
Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/field_document/121-2._exhibit_b.pdf [hereinafter UECRB Procedures]. 
64. Brian J. Bill, Detention Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground, 86 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 411, 419–421 (2010). 
65. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51. 
66. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Policy Guidance on Re-
view Procedures and Transfer and Release Authority at Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
(BTIF), Afghanistan (U), to Secretaries of the Military Departments (July 02, 2009), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf 
[hereinafter DRB Procedures]. 
67. Exec. Order No. 13,823, 3 C.F.R. § 13,823 (2018), § 2(e). 
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 Detainees be advised of the reason for the hearing and their role in the 
proceedings;68   
 Detainees receive an unclassified summary of the information consid-
ered in the review process;69 
 Detainees be appointed a personal representative to assist in their re-
view;70 
 Detainees be allowed to attend all open (unclassified) sessions;71 
 Detainees be provided with an interpreter, if necessary, or be provided 
with materials in a language the detainee understands;72  
 Detainees be allowed to call and question relevant and reasonably avail-
able witnesses;73 
 Detainees be allowed to present other information, including classified 
information through their personal representative with appropriate 
clearances;74 
 Detainees be given an opportunity, but not be compelled, to address the 
review board;75 
                                                                                                                      
68. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Initial Detainee Notification, at 2; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(1); Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Di-
rective-Type Memorandum (DTM) 12-005, Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review 
of Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay per Executive Order 13,567, to Secretaries of the 
Military Departments (May 9, 2012), http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/DTM-
12-005_Implementing_Guidelines_for_Periodic_Review_of_Detainees_Held_at.pdf 
[hereinafter DTM 12-005]. 
69. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Initial Detainee Notification, at 2; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(1); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(e), (g). 
70. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3; DRB Procedures, 
supra note 66, Personal Representative, at 5–6; Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 
3(a)(2); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 5(f)–(g). 
71. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(g), (h), (j)(3) 
–(4). 
72. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(1); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(g)(2). 
73. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(h)(4), (i), 
(j)(4)(c). 
74. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(h). 
75. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(j)(3)–(4). 
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 Detainees be given a meaningful opportunity to understand and partici-
pate in the proceedings;76 
 The review board produce a written record of the proceedings, including 
a report of final decision; 77 
 The government provide any reasonably available exculpatory infor-
mation offered by the detainee;78 
 The review board make a determination in each case of whether the de-
tainee meets the standard for continued detention and if not, make a 
recommendation regarding transfer possibilities; 79 and 
 Detainees be given periodic subsequent reviews to assess whether new 
information or circumstances surrounding their detention now permit 
transfer or release.80 
 
Detainees in the PRB context are also given the opportunity to obtain 
legal counsel of their choosing and are afforded regular file reviews that fall 
between full hearings.81 In addition, detainees at GTMO have access to fed-
eral courts for judicial habeas review of the legality of their detention.82 As 
the duration of detention at GTMO lengthens and the number of detainees 
shrinks, more process may be added to the PRB. 
It is worth noting that the processes put in place for detainee review at 
GTMO and in Afghanistan likely would not be sustainable in other environ-
ments. Consider, for example, the stresses that similarly constituted DRPs 
would have imposed on U.S. detention operations at the height of the Iraq 
War, where the United States detained more than 26,000 individuals at one 
                                                                                                                      
76. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3–4; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(1)–(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(g), (h), 
(j)(3)–(4). 
77. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 5; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(7)–(8); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(m)(1), 9. 
78. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 3; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(c)(2), (d)(1). 
79. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 5; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(7); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 6(k)(2), (m). 
80. DRB Procedures, supra note 66, Detainee Review Board, at 2; Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 51, § 3(b)–(c); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § (7)–(8). 
81. DTM 12-005, supra note 68, Attachment 3, § 5(g), 8. 
82. See About the PRB, PERIODIC REVIEW SECRETARIAT, https://www.prs.mil/About-
the-PRB (last visited Mar. 14, 2018); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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time, and more than 100,000 over the course of the campaign.83 Even with 
the U.S. military’s vast resources, the United States would not be able to 
conduct reviews for tens of thousands of detainees using the DRB or PRB 
model. Other States would likely find it equally infeasible to implement com-
parably robust and timely DRPs with thousands of detainees in the system. 
And if non-State actors are ever expected to conduct DRPs, many of the 
procedures included in the DRB and the PRB would almost certainly prove 
to be impracticable. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, U.S. formalization of its DRPs in 
DoD practice and doctrine serves as a standard and model, and it may en-
courage other States to adopt similar requirements in their military doctrines. 
Over time, such requirements may shape international law. 
 
VI. IDENTIFYING PRINCIPLED AND SUSTAINABLE ELEMENTS FOR DETAINEE 
REVIEW PROCESSES IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
 
As NIACs continue to predominate in contemporary armed conflict, parties 
to these conflicts may of necessity seek to implement reviews to ensure that 
they are detaining only the right people and only for as long as necessary. 
The law of armed conflict does not provide much guidance for detainee re-
view procedures during armed conflict, and analogizing provisions and prin-
ciples from other bodies of law is not always helpful. But over the past fifteen 
years, U.S. policy and practice and key international initiatives have supplied 
important standards that may assist States in developing norms to guide or 
inform their detainee review processes. 
Drawn from these sources, below are thirteen principled and sustainable 
elements that States and other parties to non-international armed conflicts 
might use to develop general standards for DRPs. The list of elements is 
divided between initial reviews to determine the status of the detainee and 
subsequent reviews to determine the necessity of continued detention. 
 
A. Initial Review to Determine the Status of a Detainee 
 
Parties to a NIAC should conduct initial reviews for each detainee to deter-
mine whether the individual is detainable in accordance with the following 
principles. 
                                                                                                                      
83. Michael Christie, US Military Shuts Largest Detainee Camp in Iraq, REUTERS 
(Sept. 17, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-detainees/u-s-military-
shuts-largest-detainee-camp-in-iraq-idUSTRE58G1HZ20090917. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) The detaining authority should provide timely notice.84 Notice to the detainee 
should be both oral and in writing in a language the detainee understands. 
Whenever practicable, notice should include an unclassified summary of the 
facts that support the basis for his or her detention. 
 
(2) The detaining authority should hold a timely hearing.85  Reviews should be held 
as soon as possible after the detainee is captured by the detaining authority 
or transferred to its custody or control. In most cases, this hearing should 
take place within the first sixty days, and in no case should the hearing take 
place later than six months. 
 
(3) The detainee should be able to attend and participate in unclassified portions of the 
hearing.86 DRPs should endeavor to include the detainee in as much of the 
process as possible, to include all open sessions. The detainee should be 
given the opportunity, but in no way be compelled, to address the review 
body. Such a presentation may be through a written or oral statement. If an 
interpreter is needed, the review body should reasonably seek to provide the 
detainee access to an interpreter. 
 
(4) The detainee should be provided with assistance and advocacy.87 Whenever practi-
cable, a detainee should be given access to a personal representative to assist 
in the review process. A personal representative need not be legal counsel or 
have had formal legal training. 
 
                                                                                                                      
84. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(1); CSRT Procedures, supra note 
61, encl. 1, § F; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, princ. 7, cmt. 12.1; DTM 12-005, supra 
note 68, attachment 3, § 6(e), (g); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(a), encl. 4, § 
(1)(h), (l); UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, § 5(d)(1); see also DRB Procedures, supra note 
66. 
85. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a); CSRT Procedures, supra note 61, 
encl. 1, § G(1)–(4); The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, princ. 12, cmt. 12.1; DRB Proce-
dures, supra note 66, at 2; UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, § 3(c). 
86. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); CSRT Procedures, supra note 
61, encl. 1, § C(5), F; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, cmt. 12.4; DTM 12-005, supra note 
68, attachment 3, § 6(g), (h), (j)(3)–(4); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(a), encl. 
4, § 2(a), (c); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 3–4; UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, § 
5(d)(2)–(5). 
87. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(2); CSRT Procedures, supra note 
61, encl. 1, § C(3), F; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, cmt. 12.4; DTM 12-005, supra note 
68, attachment 3, § 5(f), (g); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 2(c); DRB Procedures, 
supra note 66, at 3, 5–6. 
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(5) The detaining authority should comply with reasonable evidentiary standards.88 In 
order to accommodate information collected on the battlefield, review bod-
ies may consider information, including reasonably reliable hearsay, if rea-
sonably determined to be credible. However, the use of information ob-
tained through torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment must be 
prohibited. 
 
(6) The detaining authority should keep a written record of the proceedings.89 Review 
bodies should keep written records of the proceedings. A record does not 
need to be a verbatim transcript, but it should include enough information 
to allow for robust subsequent review. 
 
(7) The detaining authority should carry the burden of proof.90 The burden of proof 
should be on the detaining authority to demonstrate that the detainee meets 
the standard for detention. 
 
(8) The review body should be given broad access to information. 91 Review bodies 
should be provided access to all reasonably available information (including 
classified information) relevant to the determination. Detainees and their 
representatives should be given as much information as possible. 
 
(9) The detainee should be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for deten-
tion.92 Whenever practicable, review bodies should allow the detainee to in-
troduce potentially exculpatory information and call reasonably available wit-
nesses determined to have relevant information to offer the review body.  
                                                                                                                      
88. See CSRT Procedures, supra note 61, encl. 1, § G(7), (10); DTM 12-005, supra note 
68, attachment 3, § 6(b)–(h), (k)(1); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(e); DRB 
Procedures, supra note 66, at 4. 
89. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(7)–(8); CSRT Procedures, supra 
note 61, encl. 1, § C(2), G(6), H(2); DTM 12-005, supra note 68, attachment 3, § 9; ARB 
Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(b), 3(g); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 5; UECRB 
Procedures, supra note 63, § 5(d)(6). 
90. See CSRT Procedures, supra note 61, encl. 1, § G(11). 
91. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(4)–(5); CSRT Procedures, supra 
note 61 encl. 1, § E(3); The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, cmt. 12.2; DTM 12-005, supra 
note 68, attachment 3, § 6(d)–(g); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(e); DRB Pro-
cedures, supra note 66, at 2–4; UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, § 7. 
92. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(3); CSRT Procedures, supra note 
61, encl. 1, § F; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, cmt. 12.4; DTM 12-005, supra note 68, 
attachment 3, § 6(h), (j)(3)–(4); ARB Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(f)1(f); DRB 
Procedures, supra note 66, at 3–4; UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, § 6(d). 
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(10) The detaining authority should provide an impartial and objective review process.93 
The review body should be designed to offer an impartial and objective re-
view. It may be composed of military personnel. In fact, in most cases a 
board of officers will be preferable. If the detainee is detained for an ex-
tended period, or if resources permit, judicial review may be appropriate. 
 
(11) The review board should issue a timely decision.94 The review body should issue 
a decision within a reasonable time. Notice of the decision should be given 
to the detainee orally and in writing in a language the detainee understands. 
 
(12) The detainee should be allowed a timely appeal of the review board’s decision or the 
process should provide for regular reevaluation of the need for continued detention.95 The 
appeal or reevaluation may be written or oral and should be conducted by 
the review board or superior authority within a reasonable amount of time. 
 
(13) The detaining authority should make reasonable efforts at transparency.96 Trans-
parency measures should provide external actors an understanding of how 
the process works and regular updates on the status of each detainee in the 
process. 
 
B. Subsequent Periodic Reviews to Assess the Continued Necessity of Detention 
 
In addition to the initial status reviews, parties to a NIAC should conduct 
regular periodic reassessments of the individual’s detention.97 Such reviews 
should focus on the continued necessity of detention and occur every six 
months if practicable, but at least every twelve months.98 Subsequent status 
                                                                                                                      
93. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(6)–(7); CSRT Procedures, supra 
note 61, encl. 1, § B, C(1); The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, princ. 12, cmt. 12.2; ARB 
Procedures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 2(b); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 2. 
94. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(a)(7); CSRT Procedures, supra note 
61, encl. 1, § H(9), I; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, cmt. 12.3; DTM 12-005, supra note 
68, attachment 3, § 6(k)(2), (m); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 5. 
95. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(b), (c). 
96. See, e.g., Review Information, PERIODIC REVIEW SECRETARIAT, https://www.prs.mil/ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
97. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(b), (c); The Copenhagen Process, supra 
note 37, princ. 12, cmt. 12.3; DTM 12-005, supra note 68, attachment 3, § 8; ARB Proce-
dures, supra note 62, encl. 3, § 3(i); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 2; UECRB Procedures, 
supra note 63, § 3(c), 7. 
98. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 3(b), (c); The Copenhagen Process, supra note 
37, cmt. 12.3; DTM 12-005, supra note 68, attachment 3, § 8; ARB Procedures, supra note 
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reviews may also be necessary if new information calls into question the in-
itial determination.99 Further, subsequent reviews should be robust and fea-
ture all of the elements from the initial review. 
When a conflict persists for multiple years, parties may consider adding 
a judicial element to the periodic reviews.100 A judicial element is not a re-
quirement under the law and might be impracticable in situations where a 
party holds thousands of detainees in a location far from its territory. Like-
wise, it may be impractical if the party is a non-State actor that has no formal 
judicial authority. Nonetheless, when practicable, judicial review may pro-
vide additional scrutiny, which in turn, may increase the perceived legitimacy 
of the detaining party’s actions. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Detainee review has been one of the most positive developments to the 
practice of war during the United States’ armed conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and against al-Qaida. Contemporary NIACs, featuring enemies that dis-
regard State borders and intentionally disguise themselves as civilians, pre-
sent considerable challenges to States attempting to adhere to the law of 
armed conflict. Detainee review processes can help States to meet these legal 
requirements while also minimizing the costs associated with unnecessary 
detention. As evidenced by the consensus that formed during the Copenha-
gen Process, a wide range of States have recognized the importance of de-
veloping and implementing these processes. If more States see utility in de-
tainee review processes and incorporate basic procedural principles into their 
approaches to detention during armed conflict, we might see the beginning 
of the development of customary or conventional law in this area. 
 
                                                                                                                      
62, encl. 3, § 3(i); DRB Procedures, supra note 66, at 2; UECRB Procedures, supra note 63, 
§ 3(c), 7. 
99. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 51, § 8; The Copenhagen Process, supra note 37, 
princ. 12, cmt. 12.3; DTM 12-005, supra note 68, attachment 3, § 4; DRB Procedures, supra 
note 66, at 2. 
100. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
§ 1024, 125 Stat. 1298, 1565 (2011); DoD Directive 2310.01E, supra note 6, § 3(i)(3). 
